三重螺旋视角下我国制造业关键共性技术协同创新的演化博弈仿真分析

文章基于三重螺旋理论视角,引入政府对制造业关键共性技术协同创新的激励及惩罚机制,构建制造业企业、学研机构和政府的演化博弈模型,探讨演化路径、稳定策略及影响因素,并用Matlab仿真模拟。研究发现:制造业企业和学研机构从协同创新中获得收益越大,协同所需投入成本越小,双方越趋于协同,额外收益和初始成本足以使双方协同,因此无需政府过多干预;反之,政府需积极反应,政府资金支持与惩罚力度越大,制造业企业、学研机构越趋于协同创新。     

Ranking terrorists in networks: A sensitivity analysis of Al Qaeda's 9/11 attack

All over the world, intelligence services are collecting data concerning possible terrorist threats. This information is usually transformed into network structures in which the nodes represent the individuals in the data set and the links possible connections between these individuals. Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to keep track of all individuals in the resulting complex network. Therefore, Lindelauf et al. (2013) introduced a methodology that ranks terrorists in a network. The rankings that result from this methodology can be used as a decision support system to efficiently allocate the scarce surveillance means of intelligence agencies. Moreover, usage of these rankings can improve the quality of surveillance which can in turn lead to prevention of attacks or destabilization of the networks under surveillance.The methodology introduced by Lindelauf et al. (2013) is based on a game theoretic centrality measure, which is innovative in the sense that it takes into account not only the structure of the network but also individual and coalitional characteristics of the members of the network. In this paper we elaborate on this methodology by introducing a new game theoretic centrality measure that better takes into account the operational strength of connected subnetworks.Moreover, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the rankings derived from this new centrality measure for the case of Al Qaeda's 9/11 attack. In this sensitivity analysis we consider firstly the possible additional information available about members of the network, secondly, variations in relational strength and, finally, the absence or presence of a small percentage of links in the network. We also introduce a case specific method to compare the different rankings that result from the sensitivity analysis and show that the new centrality measure is robust to small changes in the data.     

供应链金融应收账款融资模式下银企博弈分析

融资难问题始终是制约中小企业发展的关键所在,供应链金融的出现,为解决中小企业的融资难问题提供了一条新途径。文章通过建立供应链金融应收账款融资模式下银企博弈模型,分析银行、核心企业和中小企业三者之间的相互关系,得出：在供应链金融应收账款融资模式中,核心企业的信用状况对中小企业的应收账款融资起着决定性的作用,当违约成本足够大时,核心企业与中小企业都会选择守约,从而实现三方共赢。     

基于互惠动机的团队激励动态博弈分析

引入被传统经济学忽略了的互惠动机行为心理特征,建立团队博弈模型,以线性契约激励为基础,分别在静态博弈和动态博弈框架下分析均衡努力和均衡产出,并进行比较分析。研究发现,无论是在静态博弈还是在动态博弈下,互惠动机都会促使代理人提高努力水平,提高团队产出,而且在动态博弈下,互惠动机的作用更强。     

Competition and Coordination in Two‐Tier Public Service Systems under Government Fiscal Policy

As a result of government budgetary limits and rapid market growth, many public service systems—such as health care—are characterized by extensive customer wait times that have become a serious problem. This problem might be solved by allowing private firms to enter these markets, which would provide customers with a choice between a free (governmental) public service provider (SP) and a fee‐charging (or “toll”) private SP. In such a two‐tier service system, the two SPs are differentiated by service quality and cost efficiency. This study focuses on the competition and coordination issues for two‐tier service systems with customers who are sensitive to both service quality and delay. The free system attempts to maximize its expected total customer utility with limited capacity, whereas the toll system attempts to maximize its profit. Neither goal is aligned with the social welfare goal of the public service. To achieve the social welfare goal, the government plays a crucial role in coordinating the two‐tier service system via the budget, the tradeoff of social members' goals, and tax‐subsidy policies. Using a mixed duopoly game, we establish Nash equilibrium strategies and identify the conditions for the existence of the two‐tier service system. We employ several interesting and counter‐intuitive managerial insights generated by the model to show that the public service can be delivered more efficiently via customer choice and SP competition. In addition, we show that a relatively low tax‐subsidy rate can almost perfectly coordinate the two SPs to achieve most of the maximum possible benefit of the two‐tier service system.     

好友推介激励机制中在线消费者依附模式研究

社会化网络的发展增加了人们在互联网上的好友资源,好友推介激励机制也具有了更多的推介对象.基于依附理论,将网络消费者进行分类,运用实验研究的方法探讨了好友推介激励机制情景下依附模式对推介双方行为模式,以及奖金分配方式公平性的影响.实验结果表明,依附回避,负向影响邀请者的出价和被邀请者的采纳;依附焦虑,正向影响邀请者的出价和被邀请者的采纳.为了达成成功的好友推介,商家应该依据消费者的依附模式设计好友推介激励机制.     

网络群体事件政府治理的演化博弈分析

利用演化博弈模型预测舆论的发展趋势,对政府应对网络群体事件采取的治理模式进行了研究.在一般化复制动态模型基础上建立网络群体事件舆论的传播方程,将地方政府部门与弱势群体的策略互动和行为演化融入到传染病传播模型中,用以模拟舆论的扩散和收敛过程.结果表明:在网络群体事件初期,如果弱势群体通过抗争获得政府补偿的概率不断增大,将造成事态的扩大.此时,地方政府应控制信息的交流程度与初始抗争人数,减缓舆论的扩散;在网络群体事件舆论大范围扩散阶段,上级政府介入并采取惩罚措施,及时披露信息,促使网络舆论的收敛平息,实现社会福利最大化.     

或有可转换债券的定价和公司资本结构

假设公司收益流服从算术布朗运动,考虑包含或有可转换债券(CCB) 的公司资本结构问题,计算公司证券均衡价格,分析公司破产概率、公司收益风险与公司资本结构之间的数量关系． 结果表明: CCB 不但显著降低破产概率,减小管理者“资产替代”动机,而且吸收公司大部分风险,大幅提升公司总价值; CCB 的收益率差价明显高于普通债券; 公司收益流与市场正(负) 相关程度越高,公司总价值越小(大) ．     

投射偏差视角下的服务类品牌消费--以农村信息消费支付意愿为例

现将投射偏差模型框架引入服务类耐用品消费者均衡中,从理论上阐述投射偏差如何会导致消费者在服务类商品消费时无法达到效用最大化。研究采用实验和实地调研的方法,一共有251名人员参与了实验与调研,分析上网体验对于未来一年宽带的支付意愿影响。研究结果发现,人们在体验上网前后对于信息的认知状态有显著差异,没有上过网的人会基于当前的认知状态而低估未来一年宽带的效用,其支付意愿明显低于上过网的人,投射偏差在服务类耐用品的消费均衡中发挥了重要作用。     

政府部门间G2G信息资源共享的演化博弈分析

简要介绍了电子政务的发展和演化博弈理论,将政府部门置于一个不断渐进地演化系统中,根据演化博弈系统构建出演化博弈模型和演化相位图,探究及分析政府部门所拥有的信息资源、信息资源共享的收益系数、政府部门的风险系数和信息资源共享中的技术成本等相关参数对政府部门之间的信息资源共享所产生的影响,并据此提出一些有针对性的建议,为提升跨政府部门之间信息资源共享能力和电子政府信息服务能力提供科学的理论支持。